

# On the computational complexity of non-dictatorial aggregation

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# Outline

## 1 Introduction: Preference Aggregation

## 2 Preliminaries

- Framework
- Statement of problems
- Characterizations (previous results)

## 3 Algorithms (new results)

- Universal Algebra
- Possibility Domains
- Uniform Possibility Domains

# Preference Aggregation

- $\mathcal{O} = \{o_1, \dots, o_k\}$ ,  $k \geq 3$ .
- $n \geq 2$  individuals,
- $<_i$ : ranking of  $i$ -th agent [strict total ordering of  $\mathcal{O}$ ].
- $X$  set of strict total orderings of  $\mathcal{O}$ .

► Social Welfare Function  $SWF : X^n \mapsto X$ .

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
▶ Social Welfare Function  $SWF : X^n \mapsto X$ .

▶ J. K. Arrow (1951): Showed that non-trivial preference aggregation is impossible given only some mild axioms that a SWF should satisfy.

# John Kenneth Arrow, 1921-2017

The conditions are:

- 1 **Universality** (unrestricted domain):  
 $SWF : X^n \mapsto X$ ,
- 2 **Independency** (independency of irrelevant alternatives): ranking  $o_i, o_j$  does **not** depend on the ranking of any other  $o_l$ .
- 3 **Pareto efficiency** (unanimity): if **everyone** ranks  $o_i$  higher than  $o_j$ ,  $o_i$  should be ranked **higher** by the  $SWF$ .




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And then we have:

## Theorem (General Possibility, 1951)

Any  $SWF$  satisfying 1, 2, 3 is a **dictatorship**: the outcome is the ranking of a **single** individual.

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# Abstract Domains

- $n$  voters,  $m$  issues.
- $A_j$  set of possible positions for  $j$ -th issue,  $|A_j| \geq 2$ .
- $X \subseteq \prod_{j=1}^m A_j$  set of feasible voting patterns.
- $X_j = A_j$ .



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Non-degeneracy conditions

# Aggregators

$\bar{f} = (f_1, \dots, f_m) : X^n \mapsto X$   $m$ -tuple of  $n$ -ary functions  $f_j : X_j^n \mapsto X_j$ :

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- 1 **Universality** and **IIA** are “built in”.
- 2 **Conservativeness** (supportiveness):

if  $x_j = (x_j^1, \dots, x_j^n) \in A_j^n$  then  $f_j(x_j) \in \{x_j^1, \dots, x_j^n\}$ ,

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for all  $j = 1, \dots, m$ .

- ▶ Stronger notion than **unanimity** (equivalent in the Boolean framework).
- ▶ The social outcome for each issue must be equal to **at least one** individual's position.

## Aggregators cont.

$$\bar{f} \left( \begin{array}{ccccc} x_1^1 & \cdots & x_j^1 & \cdots & x_m^1 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ x_1^i & \cdots & x_j^i & \cdots & x_m^i \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ x_1^n & \cdots & x_j^n & \cdots & x_m^n \end{array} \right)$$

## Aggregators cont.

$$\left( \begin{array}{c} f_1 \\ \smile \\ x_1^1 \quad \cdots \quad x_j^1 \quad \cdots \quad x_m^1 \\ \vdots \quad \quad \quad \vdots \quad \quad \quad \vdots \quad \quad \quad \vdots \\ x_1^i \quad \cdots \quad x_j^i \quad \cdots \quad x_m^i \\ \vdots \quad \quad \quad \vdots \quad \quad \quad \vdots \quad \quad \quad \vdots \\ x_1^n \quad \cdots \quad x_j^n \quad \cdots \quad x_m^n \\ \smile \\ \parallel \\ f_1(x_1) \end{array} \right)$$

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$$= \bar{f}(x^1, \dots, x^n) \in X.$$

## Majority/minority aggregators

- $\bar{f} = (f_1, \dots, f_m)$  is a **majority/minority** aggregator if for all  $j$ ,  
 $f_j(x, x, y) = f_j(x, y, x) = f_j(y, x, x) = x \mid y$ .
- $X$  admits a majority aggregator **if and only if** it admits a **ternary**  
 $\bar{f} = (f_1, \dots, f_m)$  such that, for all  $j, B_j$  (binary)  
 $f_j \upharpoonright_{B_j} = \text{maj} : \{0, 1\}^3 \mapsto \{0, 1\}$  s.t.

$$\text{maj}(x, y, z) = \begin{cases} x & \text{if } x = y \text{ or } x = z, \\ y & \text{if } y = z. \end{cases}$$

- Accordingly, it admits a minority aggregator **if and only if** it admits a **ternary**  
 $\bar{f} = (f_1, \dots, f_m)$  such that, for all  $j, B_j$  (binary)  
 $f_j \upharpoonright_{B_j} = \oplus : \{0, 1\}^3 \mapsto \{0, 1\}$ , where  $\oplus(x, y, z) = x \oplus y \oplus z$  is the  
**binary addition modulo 2**.

# Possibility Domains

## Definition

An  $n$ -ary aggregator  $\bar{f}$  is called **dictatorial** for  $X$  if there is a  $d \in \{1, \dots, n\}$  such that:  $(f_1, \dots, f_m) = (pr_d^n, \dots, pr_d^n)$ .

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Example (non-dictatorial aggregators): Majority and minority aggregators, binary  $\bar{f} = (f_1, \dots, f_m)$  s.t. **there exists** a binary  $B_j \subseteq A_j$ :  $f_j \upharpoonright_{B_j} = \wedge, \vee$ .

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# Uniform Possibility Domains

Definition (Kirousis, Kolaitis, Livieratos 2017)

$\bar{f}$  is **uniform non-dictatorial** if for all  $j, B_j$  (binary)  $f_j \upharpoonright_{B_j}$  is not a projection.

★ Boolean framework: **locally non-dictatorial** (Nehring, Puppe 2010).

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 $(pr_d^3, pr_d^3, pr_d^3, maj), \dots$  **but not** any **uniform** ones.

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- ▶ Is there an algorithm that on input  $X$ , outputs the answer to the above questions, in **polynomial time** to the number of issues  $m$  and the size  $|X|$  of  $X$ ?
- ▶ In case  $X$  is a (uniform) possibility domain, can it also output an aggregator that witnesses this?

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An aggregator of any arity  $n$  will do! The search space is too big!



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# Avoiding dictators

## Theorem (KKL, 2017)

$X$  is a *possibility domain* if and only if  $X$  admits either:

- a majority aggregator or
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## Theorem (KKL, 2017)

The following are equivalent:

- $X$  is a uniform possibility domain.
- For every  $j$ ,  $B_j \subseteq A_j$  (binary), either there is **binary** aggregator  $\bar{f}$  s.t.  $f_j \upharpoonright_{B_j} \in \{\wedge, \vee\}$  or a **ternary**  $\bar{f}$  s.t.  $f_j \upharpoonright_{B_j} \in \{\text{maj}, \oplus\}$ .

# Outline

## 1 Introduction: Preference Aggregation

## 2 Preliminaries

- Framework
- Statement of problems
- Characterizations (previous results)

## 3 Algorithms (new results)

- **Universal Algebra**
- Possibility Domains
- Uniform Possibility Domains

# Polymorphisms

- $A$  finite set.
- $R \subseteq A^m$   $m$ -ary relation.
- $f : A^n \mapsto A$   $n$ -ary polymorphism of  $R$  if:

$$\begin{aligned}x^1, \dots, x^n \in R &\Rightarrow f(x^1, \dots, x^n) \\ &:= (f(x_1^1, \dots, x_1^n), \dots, f(x_m^1, \dots, x_m^n)) \in R.\end{aligned}$$

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► We will assume all polymorphisms are **conservative/supportive** (their output is part of the input).

# Polymorphisms as aggregators

In order to use polymorphisms in our framework:

- ▶ **Mark** the elements of each  $A_j$  in a different way (color, number, etc.).
- ▶ Pass from  $X$  to  $\tilde{X} \subseteq \bigcup_{j=1}^m A_j$ .



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- ★ Any aggregator for  $X$  can be **translated** to a polymorphism of  $\tilde{X}$  and vice versa.

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# Theorem 1

## Theorem (KKL, 2018)

There is a *polynomial-time* algorithm that decides if a domain  $X$  is a *possibility domain*, and if it is, that produces a non-dictatorial aggregator of arity at *most three*.

★ We assume that  $X$  is *extensively* part of the input.

# Proof Outline

- 1 There are known algorithms to check if  $\tilde{X}$  has a majority or a minority polymorphism (Bressière & Carbonnel 2013, 2016).

# Proof Outline



- 1 There are known algorithms to check if  $\tilde{X}$  has a majority or a minority polymorphism (Bressière & Carbonnel 2013, 2016).
- 2 For the binary aggregators, define  $H_X$  with vertices  $uu'_j$ , where  $u, u' \in X_j$  s.t.  $u \neq u'$  and edges  $uu'_k \rightarrow vv'_l$ , where:
  - ▶  $k \neq l$ ,
  - ▶ there are  $z, z' \in X$  extending  $(u, v), (u', v')$  and
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

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- 3  $X$  has a binary **non-dictatorial** aggregator **if and only if**  $H_X$  is **not strongly connected**.
- ★  $H_X$  can be constructed in polynomial time and there are known polynomial algorithms (e.g. Kosaraju's and Tarjan's algorithms), that check the strong connectedness of a graph.

$H_X$  $H_{X_1}$  $H_{X_2}$ 



$$X_2 = \{(0, 1), (1, 0)\}$$

$$X_1 = \{(0, 0, 1), (0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0)\}$$





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 $(0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0) \in X_1, (0, 0, 0) \notin X_1$





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
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
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

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
 $H_{X_2}$ 

$$X_2 = \{(0, 1), (1, 0)\}$$

$H_{X_1}$  $H_{X_2}$ 


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Strongly Connected

 $H_{X_2}$ 

$$(0, 1), (1, 0) \in X_2,$$

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Not Strongly connected

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## Theorem 2

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There is a *polynomial-time* algorithm that decides if a domain  $X$  is a *uniform possibility domain*, and if it is, that produces a uniform non-dictatorial aggregator of arity at *most three*.



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There is a *polynomial-time* algorithm that decides if a domain  $X$  is a *uniform possibility domain*, and if it is, that produces a uniform non-dictatorial aggregator of arity at *most three*.

### Proof:

- (Carbonnel, 2016): There is a polynomial-time algorithm that decides if for all binary  $B \subseteq A$  there is a *polymorphism*  $f$  of a *constraint language*  $\Gamma$  (set of relations over  $A$ ) such that  $f$  is either binary and  $f \upharpoonright_B \in \{\wedge, \vee\}$ , or  $f$  is ternary and  $f \upharpoonright_B \in \{maj, \oplus\}$  and that, if there is, produces one.
- This translates to the aggregator of the characterization theorem for uniform possibility domains!

# Future Work

Open problem: What happens when  $X$  is given implicitly?

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- Integrity constraint (Grandi, Endriss 2010):  $X_\phi \subseteq \{0, 1\}^m$ : set of satisfying assignments of a propositional formula  $\phi$ .

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Open problem: What happens when  $X$  is given implicitly?

- Integrity constraint (Grandi, Endriss 2010):  $X_\phi \subseteq \{0, 1\}^m$ : set of satisfying assignments of a propositional formula  $\phi$ .
- Agenda:  $\bar{\phi} = (\phi_1, \dots, \phi_m)$ , where each individual decides if each  $\phi_j$  is true or false and  $X_{\bar{\phi}}$  contains all consistent such judgments.

Thank you!